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SECOND THOUGHTS IN THE
LAW OF PROPERTY

W

JohnV. Orth†

HEN OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, then a justice of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, delivered at the dedication of a new law school building at Boston University the address that was later
published as “The Path of the Law,” he touched upon – among many
other topics – the then burning issue of employer liability for injuries sustained by workers in the course of their employment. “It is
conceivable,” he told his audience, “that some day in certain cases
we may find ourselves imitating, on a higher plane, the tariff for life
and limb which we see in the Leges Barbarorum.”1 The learned reference was to collections of customary law from the Dark Ages,
literally the “laws of the barbarians,” that aimed to stamp out private
vengeance by imposing on the party responsible a duty to pay the
victim or his family a fixed amount, so much for an eye, a hand, a
foot, etc.2 This was Holmes at his most Olympian, marking the re†

1
2

John V. Orth is the William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. This article is his seventh reappraisal in the law of property.
10 HARV. L. REV. 456, 467 (1897).
The Leges Barbarorum were contrasted with the Leges Romanae, the laws of the
Romans. The earliest Anglo-Saxon legal compilation was the Laws of Ethelbert,
promulgated about 600 A.D.
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semblance between barbaric law and progressive proposals to establish a cost-effective administrative system to compensate workers
injured in industrial accidents – so much for an eye, a hand, a foot,
etc.3 It was also Holmes at his most impish, assuring his complacent
late-nineteenth-century listeners that if “some day” and “in certain
cases” they ever did imitate the Leges Barbarorum, it would surely
be “on a higher plane”!
The need for legislation to deal with the cost of accidents was
created by the associated common law doctrines of assumption of
the risk and the fellow servant rule, dating from the early days of
industrialization, which insulated employers from liability if the injured worker had assumed the risk of accident in return for compensation or if the proximate cause of the injury was the fault not of

3

Ethelbert’s laws are remarkable for the extraordinarily detailed schedules of tariffs established for various injuries: so much for the loss of a
leg, so much for an eye, so much if the victim was a slave, so much if he
was a freeman, so much if he was a priest. The four front teeth were
worth six shillings each, the teeth next to them four, the other teeth
one; thumbs, thumbnails, forefingers, middle fingers, ring fingers, little
fingers, and their respective fingernails were all distinguished, and a
separate price, called a bot, was set for each. Similar distinctions were
made among ears whose hearing was destroyed, ears cut off, ears
pierced, and ears lacerated; among bones laid bare, bones damaged,
bones broken, skulls broken, shoulders disabled, chins broken, collar
bones broken, arms broken, thighs broken, and ribs broken; and among
bruises outside the clothing, bruises under the clothing, and bruises
which did not show black.
Harold Berman, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 54 (1983). James C. Carter believed that the Leges Barbarorum
with their “tariff for life and limb” were only a specific example of a universal
response to disorder in primitive societies. LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND
FUNCTION 41-47 (1907).
See, e.g., The North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. 9731 (16) (12) (14) (providing for the loss of an eye compensation equal to “sixtysix and two-thirds percent of the average weekly wages during 120 weeks”; for
the loss of a hand, “sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the average weekly wages
during 200 weeks”; for the loss of a foot, “sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the
average weekly wages during 144 weeks”).
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the employer but of a fellow employee.4 The rigor of the rules had
eroded over the course of the nineteenth century as plaintiffs’ lawyers came up with ingenious arguments to allow juries to nullify the
rules’ effect by finding that employers were really the ones at fault
for employing unskilled workers, failing to supply proper equipment, or providing inadequate supervision.5 As Holmes knew from
his experience on the bench at the end of the century, “in such cases
the chance of a jury finding for the defendant [employer] is merely a
chance, once in a while rather arbitrarily interrupting the regular
course of recovery” by the injured worker.6
The common law rules, the legal system’s first response to a
problem that had ballooned in importance as the pace of industrial
development quickened and the risk of accidents increased, were in
need of repair or replacement. England, the home of the common
law and the world’s first industrial nation, responded with legislation in 1897, the year Holmes spoke.7 In America, federalism led to
a fragmented and slow-motion response, with the federal government acting in the first decade of the twentieth century to deal with
injuries in interstate commerce and the states slowly following
suit with statutes dealing with injuries in local industries over the
next four decades.8 Further complicating the process in the United
4

5

6
7

8

Both doctrines can be traced to Farwell v. Boston & Worcester RR, 35 Mass. (4
Metc.) 49 (1842). See also, for England, Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng.
Rep. 1030 (Exch. 1837). For a poem ridiculing the fellow servant rule, see Edgar
Lee Masters, Butch Weldy in THE SPOON RIVER ANTHOLOGY (1915). See also John
V. Orth, The Law in Spoon River, 16 LEGAL STUDIES FORUM 301-32 (1992).
See generally Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of
Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967).
10 HARV. L. REV. at 467.
60 & 61 Vict. c. 37 (1897). See David G. Hanes, THE FIRST BRITISH WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION ACT, 1897 (1968).
Act of June 11, 1906, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 (Federal Employers’ Liability Act)
(FELA) (carriers in interstate commerce liable to employees for injuries caused by
defective equipment or negligent supervision), amended by acts of April 22, 1908
(ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65) and April 5, 1910 (ch. 143, 36 Stat. 291). Beginning with
New York in 1910, thirty-seven states had passed workmen’s compensation statutes
by 1917. In 1948 Mississippi became the last state to adopt a workmen’s compensaAUTUMN 2006
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States was the need for legislation to run the gauntlet of judicial review, with several early workers’ compensation statutes being held
unconstitutional.9
The pattern of rule and reaction is not limited to the law’s response to the problem of liability for industrial accidents. It repeats
as the passage of time reveals dissatisfaction with results in other
situations, whether because of deeper analysis, accumulated experience, or the force of contrary opinion. No area of the law offers
more examples than property law because of its extraordinary longevity. For centuries, while torts and criminal law were underdeveloped and contract law was most noticeable by its absence, property law was elaborated by an intricate interaction of developing
caselaw and interfering legislation. One of the first statutes in the
English lawbook, De Donis Conditionalibus (1285),10 the root of
the fee tail, was enacted to overturn a line of common law decisions. The oldest treatise on English property law was Littleton’s
Tenures from about 1481, greatly elaborated by Sir Edward Coke’s
commentaries more than a century later,11 while the first English
book on contracts would not appear for more than three hundred
tion statute. Latterly the name of the statutes has been changed, in the interest of
gender-neutrality, to Worker’s Compensation Act. E.g., N.C. Sess. Laws 1979,
c. 714, § 1.
9
Employers’ Liability Case, 207 U.S. 463 (1908) (holding 1906 FELA unconstitutional
because it applied to intrastate as well as to interstate carriers); Employers’ Liability
Case, 223 U.S. 1 (1912) (upholding FELA as amended); Ives v. South Buffalo Railway
Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1911) (holding N.Y. Workmen’s Compensation
Act unconstitutional for violation of the due process clauses of state and federal
constitutions); New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (upholding Act
reenacted after amendment of N.Y. Constitution).
10
13 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1285). For its background and subsequent history, see John V.
Orth, Does the Fee Tail Exist in North Carolina?, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 77378 (1988).
11
Edward Coke, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON (1628). Following the pattern
established by the four books of Justinian’s Institutiones, comprehensive treatments
of law were commonly divided into four books or “institutes.” Coke on Littleton –
cited by generations of lawyers as Co. Litt. – is also known as the First Institute.
Coke’s Second, Third, and Fourth Institutes were published posthumously in 1641.
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years,12 and treatises on tort law were delayed more than sixty years
after that.13
The joint tenancy and its associated right of survivorship, dating
from the thirteenth century, functioned as a will substitute in a
world before wills. Originally intended to keep estates intact to facilitate the collection of feudal incidents, the joint tenancy was actually used to subvert that purpose by facilitating the development of
feoffments to uses, separating the legal title (held by feoffees in joint
tenancy) from the equitable title of the beneficiaries. So widespread
was this practice that it came to be assumed that grants to two or
more were intended to be in joint tenancy, rather than in tenancy in
common. Abolition of the feudal incidents eliminated the need to
avoid them, but by then the use (or, as it was then coming to be
called, the trust) had proved its utility in other ways. The presumption in favor of joint tenancy had outlived its purpose and became
instead a trap for the unwary.14 Without the advice of a skilled conveyancer, grantees could end up with an estate whose operation
they did not understand and whose results they did not want – “a
manifest injustice,” as the North Carolina General Assembly put it
in 1784, “to the families of such as happen to die first.”15
The common law’s response was characteristically devious: applying a relaxed presumption in wills as opposed to deeds16 and, as
to the latter, strictly applying the technical requirements of the so-

12

John Joseph Powell, ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS
(1790). See P.S. Atiyah, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 103
(1979).
13
Francis Hilliard, THE LAW OF TORTS (1859). See G. Edward White, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 4 (1985); S.F.C. Milsom, A NATURAL
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 13 (2003).
14
See John V. Orth, Joint Tenancy Law, Plus ça Change …, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 173-80
(2002).
15
Act of 1784, ch. 22, § 6, reprinted in 24 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH
CAROLINA 574 (Walter Clark ed. 1904).
16
See 2 William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 193 (1766)
(“Bl. Com.”).
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called four unities to avoid the application of the presumption.17 The
final remedy was legislative. States that confronted the issue first,
such as North Carolina and Pennsylvania, abolished the right of survivorship as an incident of joint tenancies,18 while states that dealt
with the issue later, such as Illinois and Iowa, discovered a simpler
solution: reverse the presumption.19 The second legislative thought
was better than the first. There was no reason not to allow the creation of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship if the parties knew
what they were getting into and wanted it. States in the first group
eventually caught up, Pennsylvania by a fairly prompt judicial gloss
that the statute only applied in the absence of clearly expressed intention to the contrary, North Carolina by an amendment to the
statute two centuries later.20
Wills law provides some of the best examples of second, third,
and more thoughts on the most expedient rule. A creature of statute, not of the common law, the will first became possible with the
adoption of the Wills Act of 1540.21 Indicative of the complex interaction of statute and common law that would follow, experience
over more than a century with evidentiary problems led to further
legislation. The Statute of Frauds, best known today for its provisions concerning contracts, had a section on wills that required, in
quaint fashion, a writing with “three or four credible witnesses,”22
17

Although really a description of the nature rather than the creation of the joint
tenancy, the Doctrine of the Four Unities – that joint tenants must at all times
have “one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the same undivided possession,” id. at 180 – could function in the hands of an astute judge as a screen to
prevent the recognition of unwanted joint tenancies by finding some defect in the
unities.
18
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-2; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 110.
19
765 ILCS 1005/1; Iowa Code Ann. § 557.15.
20
Arnold v. Jack’s Executors, 24 Pa. 57 (1854). See John V. Orth, The Joint Tenancy
Makes a Comeback in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 491 (1991) (describing
amendment to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-2).
21
32 Hen. 8, ch. 1 (1540).
22
29 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 5 (1676).
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the germ of the modern written attested will. Applying standard
common law rules on witness competency, the courts then proceeded to invalidate wills witnessed by persons benefiting as devisees or legatees in the will. To remedy this, in 1752 parliament in
turn adopted the so-called purging statute, widely copied in American states.23 Drafted on the assumption that the testator’s primary
intention was that the will be valid, the statute saved it by purging
interested witnesses (and their spouses) of their interests. Thus was
the will saved, but oftentimes at the expense of invalidating the very
gifts that had been its primary purpose. New legislation was required and is today slowly making its way through the state legislatures.24
Wills are delayed-action documents, executed one day to be effective later, often much later, when the testator dies.25 What if the
testator’s situation changes but the will remains the same? At common law, subsequent marriage and the birth of issue revoked the
will.26 The rationale was that the ordinary testator would want in
such circumstances to make new provisions, that failure to do so
23

25 Geo. 2, ch. 6, § 1 (1752). E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 191, § 2; N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 31-10.
24
E.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 6112 (allowing interested witnesses but raising a rebuttable presumption that their devises were procured by duress, menace, fraud, or
undue influence). See also Uniform Probate Code § 2-505 (1990) (accepting interested witness as competent).
25
Wills are said to be “ambulatory,” that is, inoperative until the testator’s death; in
consequence, they are capable of disposing of property acquired after execution.
The same characteristic is referred to in the Bible: “For where a testament is,
there must also of necessity be the death of the testator. / For a testament is of
force after men are dead: otherwise it is of no strength at all while the testator
liveth.” Heb. 9: 16-17 (KJV).
26
2 Bl. Com. 502. Indeed, the common law went further: any change in testator’s
circumstances could revoke the devise. For a survey of the cases, see 4 James
Kent, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 528-31 (12th ed. by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, 1873). Lord Mansfield criticized these results and announced his opinion
that “constructive revocations, contrary to the intention of the testator, ought not
to be indulged; and that some over-strained resolutions of that sort had brought a
scandal upon the law.” Swift v. Roberts, 3 Burr. 1488, 1491, 97 Eng. Rep. 941,
942-43 (K.B. 1764).
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was most likely the result of inattention, and that in such cases the
results produced by the canons of descent (that is, by intestate succession) would probably be preferable to the unamended will. That
went too far for some and legislation was adopted: subsequent marriage alone should be sufficient.27 But then, why should the law revoke the will at all? Why not provide for an “overlooked” spouse in
other ways? So pretermitted spouse statutes were adopted, reserving a share of the estate for the spouse but otherwise leaving the will
in effect.28
Divorce (like the will itself) was unknown to the common law,
so divorce had no necessary effect on wills. But what if a testator
died leaving unchanged a will with provision for a now ex-spouse?
Again it was difficult to imagine that the ordinary testator intended
this result. Legislation ensued, revoking such testamentary dispositions.29 But what about gifts to the relatives of ex-spouses, such as
former in-laws or step-children? And what about provisions in favor
of ex-spouses in all those proliferating means to pass property at
death, “will substitutes” like revocable trusts, pay-on-death contracts, joint and survivor accounts? More legislation.30
What if a will beneficiary dies before the will becomes effective
at the death of the testator? Gifts inter vivos or testamentary cannot
be given to the dead, so the gift lapses, that is, fails. But is that the
correct inference to draw from a testator’s failure to provide a substitutionary gift in the original will or to add a codicil taking account
of the change caused by the death? Legislation was adopted to prevent the effect of the lapse of a gift to a named individual but only if
the individual was closely related to the testator and died leaving
issue.31 In the case of a gift to a class, such as a gift to “grandchil27

E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-257.
E.g., Fla. Stat. § 732.301. See also Uniform Probate Code § 2-301 (1990, as
amended 1993).
29
E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-5.4.
30
See Uniform Probate Code § 2-804 (1990, as amended 1997) (revoking gifts by
will or will substitute to relatives of ex-spouse as well as to ex-spouse).
31
E.g., Tex. Probate Code Ann. § 68.
28
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dren,” the common law had provided a sort of anti-lapse protection
by providing for distribution among any surviving class members.
As the number of class members got smaller, the potential share of
each got bigger until final distribution at the testator’s death. Was
this what the testator likely intended? Or should the anti-lapse statute be amended to apply in the case of class gifts as well? More legislation.32
The list could be extended with examples of other attempts involving repeated legislative efforts to effectuate presumed intent in
cases in which a testator failed to make express provision – statutes
concerning pretermitted children,33 ademption by extinction,34
ademption by satisfaction35 – although not all gaps are filled. And in
some cases deliberately so; that is, in some cases the testator’s actual
intention is known, not merely presumed, but crossed nonetheless.
The right of survivorship associated with the joint tenancy can be
severed by inter vivos conveyance of an undivided share, but not by
provision in a will, no matter how plainly expressed. As one respected casebook puts it:
A large number of joint tenants select the tenancy precisely
because of the high degree of assurance that there will be no
entanglement with probate. To continue this assurance, the
right of testamentary disposition must be denied, and the
32

E.g., 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 83 (adding to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-42(a) “In the case
of the class devise, the issue shall take whatever share the deceased devisee would
have taken had the devisee survived the testator” the words “in the event the deceased class member leaves no issue, the devisee’s share shall devolve upon the
members of the class who survived the testator and the issue of any deceased
members taking by substitution”).
33
E.g., Fla. Stat. § 732.302; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-5.5. See Uniform Probate Code
§ 2-302 (1990, as amended 1993). Like pretermitted spouses, pretermitted children are those born after the execution of a will and left unprovided for.
34
E.g., Uniform Probate Code § 2-606 (1990, as amended 1997). Ademption refers
to those situations in which the subject of a specific gift indicated in a will is absent
from the estate at testator’s death, either because it was parted with inter vivos
(ademption by extinction) or because it was given during life to the intended
donee (ademption by satisfaction).
35
E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-24.
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few attempts by ignorant testators to devise their part of
joint tenancy property must fail.36

The juridical conscience is salved by the thought that such attempts
are “few” and the disappointed testators “ignorant,” so the frustration of clearly expressed intention is not so barbaric after all.
What should be the result if a married person deliberately excludes a spouse from the provisions of a will? The common law’s
solution to the problem of providing for the surviving spouse
(whether there was a will or not) was dower for the widow and
curtesy for the widower. Dower was a life estate in one-third of all
estates of freehold of which the husband was seized during the marriage,37 while curtesy was a life estate in all the estates of freehold of
which the wife was seized during the marriage, but only on condition that live issue had been produced.38 For obvious reasons neither
estate was convenient except in situations of large and stable landownership, the common law’s presumed original position. Even
then, both were routinely avoided by private arrangements in the
form of strict settlements.
In modern times curtesy was eliminated and dower extended to
both sexes, but this eventually proved unsatisfactory. At last, even
the old name was erased, replaced by a statutory elective share,
granting the surviving spouse the right to demand a portion of the
decedent’s estate. At first applicable only to property passing by
will, the elective share has been progressively but unevenly extended to property passing outside the will by various will substitutes. Constantly tinkered with by further legislation in an effort to
afford more perfect equity and now exhibiting a bewildering array
of forms in various states, the modern elective share defies generalization – so much so that one widely used casebook posts a prominent warning: “Caution. There is no subject in this book on which
there is more statutory variation than the surviving spouse’s elective
36

Jesse Dukeminier et al., WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES 345 (7th ed. 2005).
2 Bl. Com. 129.
38
Id. at 126. For an historical explanation of why curtesy was greater than dower,
see S.F.C. Milsom, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 60-61 (2003).
37
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share.”39 The operation of federal tax law has actually prompted a
revival of life interests for surviving spouses, usually widows, in the
form of “qualified terminal interest property,” QTIP for short, leading one scholar to describe it as “the new federal law of dower”40 – a
return, if not to the laws of the barbarians, at least to the laws of the
Middle Ages.
And what should be the result if a person named in a will murders the testator? It is difficult to imagine a testator intending the
gift under such circumstances. And public policy seems to demand
that the wrongdoer be deprived of the benefit. “No one should
profit from his own wrong.”41 But can this untoward result be prevented by common law, or is legislation required? Experience with
the so-called slayer statutes has revealed a host of problems. What is
to be done with the gift to the murderer? What if the crime was
manslaughter rather than homicide? What if no prosecution is possible because the murder was immediately followed by the suicide of
the murderer? – in which case no earthly profit is at issue. What of
so-called “mercy killings” in which the “victim” requests death at the
hands of a loved one in order to shorten a lingering and painful
death? And what about will substitutes benefiting the murderer?
Particular problems arise with the application of the slayer statutes
to joint tenancies with right of survivorship since the theory of the
joint tenancy, which long predated the Wills Act, does not concep-

39

Dukeminier et al., WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES at 425.
Mary M. Wenig, Taxing Marriage, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 561
(1997).
41
Cal. Civ. Code § 3517 (“No one can take advantage of his own wrong.”); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 31A-15 (“no person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong.”).
See also the celebrated common law case of Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511,
22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889) (“No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud,
or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.”); Ronald Dworkin, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 23 (1978) (discussing Riggs).
40
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tualize the effect of the death of one joint tenant as passing any interest to the survivor. More and still more legislation.42
Second and subsequent thoughts are not unique to the legislature. The judiciary too regularly rethinks the law, although it is
somewhat harder to observe. Part of the problem is the slippery
nature of the common law itself. Although it originated in England
centuries ago, the common law is domesticated in America. “The
common law of England,” Justice Joseph Story declared on behalf of
the United States Supreme Court in 1829, “is not to be taken in all
respects to be that of America.”43 And, a few years later, he added
that the decisions of courts concerning the common law “are often
reexamined, reversed, and qualified by the Courts themselves,
whenever they are found to be either defective, or ill-founded, or
otherwise incorrect.”44
Early in the twentieth century, in an apparent attempt to stabilize the common law and perhaps insulate it from further legislative
meddling, the legal establishment commenced the project that resulted in the monumental Restatements of the Law. Although the
project seemed to call only for the reduction to black letter of the
basic common law rules, the Restaters did not confine themselves to
stating (or “restating”) whatever rule was applied by the majority of
courts but chose instead the rule they judged best. The adoption of
minority rules made the Restatements a vehicle for legal innovation,45 and the Restaters became, like poets, “unacknowledged legis42

E.g., 84 Okla. Stat. Supp. 1975 § 231 (effective June 12, 1975) (amending slayer
statute to prohibit slayer from “receiv[ing] any interest in the estate of the victim
…, or as a surviving joint tenant”).
43
Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829).
44
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1834). For an essay reflecting on the
consequences of this view of the common law operating within a system governed
by a written constitution, see John V. Orth, Can the Common Law Be Unconstitutional?, in HOW MANY JUDGES DOES IT TAKE TO MAKE A SUPREME COURT? AND
OTHER ESSAYS ON LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION ch. 3 (2006).
45
See David Thomas, Anglo-American Land Law: Diverging Developments from a Shared
History – Part III: British and American Real Property Law and Practice – A Contemporary
Comparison, 34 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST J. 443, 479 (1999).
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lators.”46 Having themselves had second thoughts about some settled
doctrines, the first Restaters unintentionally invited still further
thoughts.47 The result has been Second and even Third Restatements, as later generations of Restaters think yet again.

HI

S

hortly after Holmes delivered his oration at Boston University,
the eminent lawyer James C. Carter prepared lectures for delivery at the Harvard Law School, the culmination of his lifelong campaign against legislative codification of the common law. Concluding
his survey of law’s “origin, growth, and function,” Carter complacently announced:
We now come to the last stage in our inquiry concerning
what has actually governed the conduct of men in society.
This is the stage of full enlightenment, such as is exhibited
in Europe and the United States at the present day … .48

This fatuous statement is simply an unguarded expression of a sentiment that is (and always has been) current in some circles, mainly
academic: the belief that after their second or third or more thought
the final thought would have been thought.
The point, of course, is not that our law should become like that
of the Medes and the Persians, which, if the Bible is to be taken literally, “changeth not.”49 There is no reason not to think again and
46

See Percy Bysshe Shelley, A DEFENSE OF POETRY (1821) (“Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.”).
47
See Grant Gilmore, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 67 (1974) (asking “Why should
there be a second series of Restatements?”).
48
James C. Carter, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION 66 (1907). For
repeated references to “the present enlightened age,” see id. at 115, 119. Intended
for delivery in early 1905, the lectures were never actually delivered because of
Carter’s untimely death. For Carter’s place in American legal history, see Bernard
Schwartz, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 337-46 (“James C.
Carter: Written Law – ‘Victorious upon Paper and Powerless Elsewhere’”); 35363 (“Legal Thought in Action: Carter versus Field”) (1993).
49
Esther 1:19 (KJV).
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again about improving the existing rules, while at the same time
recognizing the value of stability. What really deserves a second
thought is the notion that at the next meeting (or perhaps the one
after that) of the particular drafting committee, whether of state
legislators or of academic experts, the last stage of “full enlightenment” will have been reached.
What history teaches is not some simple and simply applied rule
for future behavior, nor is it only the clichéd notion that “everything
changes,” or, as Carter would have put it, “progresses.” Instead, by
showing with specificity how things have changed – how often, how
incompletely, how ultimately unsatisfactorily they have changed –
history informs our thoughts about future change and leads us to
abandon the pursuit of the ignis fatuus of full enlightenment. Something Holmes said earlier about consistency in the law is also true of
the quest for legal perfection:
The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never
reaching, consistency. It is forever adopting new principles
from life at one end, and it always retains old ones from history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or
sloughed off. It will become entirely consistent only when it
ceases to grow.50

What deserves another thought, in other words, is the thought that
our last thought is the last possible thought. Holmes knew better.

50

Oliver Wendell Holmes, THE COMMON LAW 32 (1881).
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